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Abstract—With the explosive growth of smart IoT devices at
the edge of the Internet, embedding sensors on mobile devices
for massive data collection and collective environment sensing has
been envisioned as a cost-effective solution for IoT applications.
However, existing IoT platforms and framework rely on dedicated
middleware for (semi-) centralized task dispatching, data storage
and incentive provision. Consequently, they are usually expensive
to deploy, have limited adaptability to diverse requirements, and
face a series of data security and privacy issues. In this paper,
we employ permissionless blockchains to construct a purely
decentralized platform for data storage and trading in a wireless-
powered IoT crowdsensing system. In the system, IoT sensors use
power wirelessly transferred from RF-energy beacons for data
sensing and transmission to an access point. The data is then
forwarded to the blockchain for distributed ledger services, i.e.,
data/transaction verification, recording, and maintenance. Due to
coupled interference of wireless transmission and transaction fee
incurred from blockchain’s distributed ledger services, rational
sensors have to decide on their transmission rates to maximize
individual utility. Thus, we formulate a noncooperative game
model to analyze this competitive situation among the sensors.
We provide the analytical condition for the existence of the Nash
equilibrium as well as a series of insightful numerical results
about the equilibrium strategies in the game.
Index Terms—crowdsensing, blockchain, energy harvesting,
concave games
I. INTRODUCTION
At the dawn of 5G, the world has seen an enormous increase
in the number of pervasively connected IoT devices, which are
used in a plethora of scenarios such as vehicular networks,
the logistics/manufacturing sectors, smart homes and e-health.
With the trend of sensor miniaturization and the widespread
adoption of IPv6, Cisco predicts that by 2021 an extraordinary
amount of 847ZB data will be generated by IoT devices
annually and about 7.2ZB will be finally stored worldwide [1].
Such technological development has created unprecedented
opportunities of access to ubiquitous sensing data about the
context in concern, e.g., smart city and urban environment,
for both real-time use and big data-based analysis. However,
it also imposes great challenges to network operation and data
processing. Compared with the conventional Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSNs), most of the IoT sensors are owned by users
instead of operators. Meanwhile, the data generated by the
same sensors may be consumed by different data services,
which require various levels of data quality, timeliness and
sampling frequency for different purposes. For this reason,
conventional WSNs is limited in proliferation due to the cost
of deployment and maintenance as well as the rigidness with
task-specified data processing/dispatching structures.
To overcome the limitations of conventional WSNs in both
network operation and data processing, a number of novel
paradigms have been proposed at both the network side and
the data processing side. In [2], a framework of wireless-
powered sensing systems was proposed to address the issues
of limited temporal-spatial coverage in urban crowdsensing
over wearables. Therein, the mobile operator deploys ultra-
dense charging stations using energy beamforming in small
cells, which only require incremental upgrade of the protocols
running on existing infrastructure. Such design enables the
accommodation of the massive-scale, already-in-field IoT de-
vices for Radio Frequency (RF)-powered pervasive sensing.
Power transfer is used as incentiveness for IoT devices to
execute tasks of crowdsensing applications. For involved par-
ties, this framework helps to form the basis of an energy-data
market at the data collection stage. At the operator side, data
processing/aggregation is usually delegated to the cloud-based
backend [3] or semi-centralized edge servers [4]. Under this
paradigm, interconnections between the sensor cloud and the
data processing backend rely on an intermediate layer provided
by the operator for handling the tasks of data mediation, such
as task association, data filtering, privacy preserving and data-
integrity verification [3]. However, with the presence of such a
middleware pre-designed and fully controlled by the operator,
the IoT platforms and crowdsensing framework face the same
problem of lacking adaptability and high installation cost as
in WSNs. Also, the centralization of data processing, storage
and trading inevitably causes the security risks such as data
falsification and manipulation because of a single breach.
To overcome the flaws and vulnerability caused by cen-
tralization at the data processing stage, we resort to the
emerging technology of permissionless blockchains [5] to
ensure that the task assignment, the data collection, storage
and trading are all performed in a decentralized but trusted
manner. Then, the intermediate layer can be safely removed
to enhance privacy and data security while the data integrity is
still publicly verifiable. In brief, a permissionless blockchain
system can be seen as a replicated database maintained by
a number of pseudonymous nodes over peer-to-peer (P2P)
connections. Blockchains use the public key infrastructure
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(PKI) mechanism and the data structure of hash linked list to
ensure that the time order and the content of a data record
(also known as a transaction) cannot be tampered without
being noticed once it is confirmed on the chain [5]. The
blockchain relies on Byzantine fault-tolerate mechanisms, e.g.,
Nakamoto protocol [6] or Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance
(PBFT) protocol [7], to coordinate the Byzantine agreement,
i.e., peer consensus, about the state of the transaction storage
among the consensus nodes. For permissionless blockchains,
the messaging complexity for reaching the consensus among
the P2P nodes are expected to be sufficiently low such that
the size of the consensus network scales well.
In this paper, we propose a novel framework of an RF-
powered IoT crowdsensing system. The IoT system under
consideration involves three parties, i.e., the massive-scale
IoT devices/sensors working as a sensing cloud, the wireless
network operator, and the permissionless blockchain network
as shown in Fig. 1. The sensors operate by using wireless
power transferred from RF-energy beacons. The power is
used for data sensing by the sensors and data transmission
to the access point. The network operator provides wireless
power transfer facility, i.e., RF-energy beacons, and data
communication services, i.e., an access point, for the sensors.
As such, the sensors are charged with a certain price by
the network operator. Afterwards, the sensors send their data
to the blockchain for distributed ledger functions, e.g., data
verification, logging, and executing a set of actions using
smart contracts in the form of programmable automata on
the chain [8]. The blockchain network adapts the scheme of
Proof-of-Work (PoW) [6] for Sybil attack prevention [5]. The
blockchain also charges a transaction fee for processing the
data from sensors. Finally, the sensors can trade their verified
and secured data in the blockchain to data consumers, gaining
a certain revenue. Note that here the data trading processes are
completely self-organized with no middle layer controlled by
the operator. From the perspective of the sensors and the data
consumers, the blockchain can be regarded as a decentralized
platform as a service.
By choosing the data transmission rates, the sensors are
rational and self-interested in maximizing their utility which
is defined as a function of the revenue from trading their data,
the price paid to the network operator and the transaction
fee paid to the blockchain network. However, this leads to
a competitive situation because of coupled interference in
wireless communication and transaction fee determination,
which are functions of the transmission rate of each sensor. To
study this situation, we therefore introduce a noncooperative
game model. The following key properties are guaranteed in
our proposed IoT system:
• The data, i.e., transaction, throughput of the blockchain
scales well such that the massive data volume from the
sensor cloud is handled smoothly.
• The rational and self-interested sensors noncooperatively
decide on their own sensing/transferring data for individ-
ual utility optimization.
• The sensors are able to reach a system equilibrium in a
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Figure 1: Schematics of the RF-powered IoT crowdsensing
system.
self-organized manner with limited coordination among
themselves.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an RF-powered IoT crowdsensing system as
shown in Fig. 1. Specifically, a cloud of sensors, the set of
which is denoted by N , harvest energy from the beamforming-
enabled RF-energy beacons deployed by the network operator
to support data transfer from the sensors to the access point.
Each sensor i∈N independently negotiates with the operator
about the wirelessly received power level pi within the range
Dpi = [0, pui ]. Let ci be the fixed power level used by sensor
i for circuit maintenance and data sensing. Then, the power
used by sensor i to transmit data for storage and trading
is pi − ci. We assume that the propagation model for data
transmission of sensor i follows (1) and consider the path
loss as a function of the distance di between sensor i and
the access point connected to the blockchain. Let r = [ri]
>
i∈N
be the vector of the transmission rates, p = [pi]
>
i∈N be the
vector of received powers, i.e., the power transferred from the
RF-energy beacons received by a sensor. Likewise, p−i be the
vector of the received powers except sensor i, the transmission
rate of sensor i can be derived as follows ∀i ∈ N :
ri = Ri (pi,p−i) = bilog2
1 + gi pi−ci(di)αi∑
j 6=i
gj
pj−cj
(dj)
αj + σ2
 , (1)
where σ2 is the variance of the additive white Gaussian noise,
gi is the channel gain of sensor i, and bi is the correspond-
ing bandwidth. We define R (p) = [Ri (pi,p−i)]
>
i∈N , where
R (p) :Dp=×i∈N Dpi 7→ Dr is a continuous closed mapping.
We assume that the data services, e.g., data storage, trading
and task dispatching, are implemented on top of a permission-
less blockchain. The sensing data are formated into normal
transactions of fixed size. To enhance efficiency, only the
digest of each transaction is stored on the chain, and the
content of the transactions are stored by each consensus
node off-chain. To address the issue of transaction throughput
bottleneck in Bitcoin-like blockchains, we adopt the protocol
of ELASTICO for sharded blockchain in [9], where the trans-
action throughput increases linearly with the computational
power admitted by the blockchain. Compared with the existing
protocols based on PoW (see [5] and the references therein),
the sharded blockchain employs the process of PoW puzzle
solving for identity establishment and forms a number of con-
sensus committees to handle the received transactions in dis-
joint subsets through standard Byzantine agreement protocols.
Therefore, it is possible to scale the transaction throughput
of the blockchain according to the total transmission rate of
the sensors as long as the sensors are able to sustain the
maintenance cost of the blockchain.
We consider that the maintenance cost of the blockchain
is measured in the supplied computational power. Based
on the linear relationship between the computational power
and the transaction throughput, we can further express
the required computational power as m
∑
j∈N Rj (pj ,p−j),
where m > 0 is the computational power coefficient and∑
j∈N Rj (pj ,p−j) is the total data rate of the sensor cloud.
Furthermore, it is well-known that the power consumption in
modern computer architecture can be modeled as a quadratic
function of the corresponding computational frequency [10].
Therefore, the power consumption of the sharded blockchain
network can be derived as
pb=a
m∑
j∈N
Rj (pj ,p−j)
2+b
m∑
j∈N
Rj (pj ,p−j)
+c,
(2)
where a, b and c are the power consumption coefficients.
To enjoy the data service (e.g., smart contracts and transac-
tion recording) provided by the sharded blockchain, sensor
i needs to pay the transaction fee to compensate the cost
of the consensus nodes incurred by energy consumption. We
assume that the sensors proportionally share the blockchain
maintenance cost among themselves according to the volume
of data that they propose to the blockchain. Then, the rate
of payment by sensor i depends on its fraction of the total
transmit rate as follows:
Ci =
Ri(pi,p−i)∑
j∈N Rj(pj ,p−j)
{
a
[
m
∑
j∈N Rj (pj ,p−j)
]2
+b
[
m
∑
j∈N Rj(pj ,p−j)
]
+ c
}
.
(3)
The revenue of a sensor is a function of the volume of
its sensing data recorded by the blockchain. Let λi denote
the price of unit bitrate of sensor i and φ denote the price
of unit power transferred from the RF-energy beacons. To
support the wirelessly received power level pi for sensor i, the
wirelessly transferred power level of the RF-energy beacons
i is P t (pi, dti) = pi (d
t
i)
η based on the Slivnyak-Meckes
theorem [11], where η is the path-loss exponent of wirelessly
power transfer and dti is the distance between the RF-energy
beacons and sensor i. Based on (1)-(3), the utility of sensor i
can be expressed as follows:
ui (pi,p−i) = λiRi (pi,p−i)− φP t
(
pi, d
t
i
)− Ri(pi,p−i)∑
j∈N Rj(pj ,p−j)
×
{
a
[
m
∑
j∈N
Rj (pj ,p−j)
]2
+b
[
m
∑
j∈N
Rj (pj ,p−j)
]
+c
}
.
(4)
In (4), a larger λi indicates a higher quality (hence a higher
value) of the data generated by sensor i.
Each sensor aims to maximize its individual utility, i.e.,
max
pi∈Dpi
ui (pi,p−i), given the interference from other sensors.
Therefore, the sensors’ strategy are coupled, and a nonco-
operative game can be formulated as a four-tuple Gs =
{N ,p,Dp,u}, where
• N is the set of active sensors, i.e., the players;
• Dp ⊂ R|N | is the domain of p, i.e., strategy, and an
|N |-polyhedron;
• p ∈ Dp is the sensor-determined received power vector;
• u = [ui]i∈N is the vector of sensors’ utilities as a
function of p, where ui is given by (4).
Based on the game formulation, we consider the Nash
equilibrium to be the solution for the sensors.
III. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
To ease the analysis of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of Gs, we
consider that the sensors optimize their utilities by deciding
on their transmission rates instead of on their strategies p.
This is owning to the fact that the vector of the functions
describing the relationship between r and p, i.e., r = R (p), is
a continuous, closed injective operator as shown in Theorem 1.
Then, there exists an inverse operator of R (p), denoted by
R−1 (r) : Dr 7→ Dp such that the sensors’ received powers p
is determined given their transmission rates r.
THEOREM 1. There exists an inverse operator of R (p), i.e.,
R−1 (r) : Dr 7→ Dp, such that p = R−1 (r).
Proof. Let γi (ri) = e
ri ln 2
bi − 1, βi (pi) = gi pi−ci(di)αi , and
β (p) = [βi (pi)]
>
i∈N . According to (1), we have
γi (ri) = Λi (β (p)) =
βi (pi)∑
j 6=i
βj (pj) + σ2
. (5)
Since ∀i∈N both γi (ri) and βi (pi) are continuous, closed
injective operators, the injective properties of R (p) can be
ensured iff Λ (β (p)) = [Λi (β (p))]i∈N is injective.
We prove by contradiction that Λ (β (p)) is injective. As-
sume that Λ (β (p)) is not injective. Then, there exist p′,
p∈Dp and p′ 6=p such that r′=r. Without loss of generality,
we assume p′i>pi. To ensure r
′
i = ri, p
′ should satisfy
βi (p
′
i)∑
j 6=i
βj
(
p′j
)
+ σ2
=
βi (pi)∑
j 6=i
βj (pj) + σ2
, (6)
and hence
∑
j 6=i
βj
(
p′j
)
=
βi (p
′
i)
βi (pi)
∑
j 6=i
βj (pj) +
[
βi (p
′
i)
βi (pi)
− 1
]
σ2. (7)
By (7), for ∀l∈N , we have the following equality:
βl(p′l)∑
j 6=l
βj(p′j)+σ2
=
βl(p′l)
βi(p′i)+
∑
j 6=i
βj(p′j)−βl(p′l)+σ2
(7)
=
βl(p′l)
βi(p′i)+
βi(p′i)
βi(pi)
∑
j 6=i
βj(pj)+
[
βi(p′i)
βi(pi)
−1
]
σ2−βl(p′l)+σ2
=
βl(p′l)
βi(p′i)
βi(pi)
[ ∑
j∈N
βj(pj)+σ2
]
−βl(p′l)
.
(8)
With r′=r, we have r′l=rl, ∀l∈N . Then, according to (8),
we have the following equality condition:
βl(pl)∑
j 6=l
βj(pj)+σ2
=
βl(p′l)∑
j 6=l
βj(p′j)+σ2
=
βl(p′l)
βi(p′i)
βi(pi)
[ ∑
j∈N
βj(pj)+σ2
]
−βl(p′l)
⇔ βl (p′l) =
βi(p′i)
βi(pi)
βl (pl) .
(9)
Summing βl (p′l) with respect to l over N leads to∑
l∈N
βl (p
′
l) =
∑
l∈N
βi(p′i)
βi(pi)
βl (pl). This contradicts with the
result derived from (7), i.e., βi (p′i) +
∑
j 6=i
βj
(
p′j
)
=∑
j∈N
βj
(
p′j
)
=
βi(p′i)
βi(pi)
∑
j∈N
βj (pj) +
[
βi(p′i)
βi(pi)
− 1
]
σ2. There-
fore, the assumption that Λ (β (p)) is not injective cannot be
true, and Λ (β (p)) is injective. With the injective property of
γi (ri) and βi (pi), ∀i ∈ N , R (p) is an injective operator.
Since R (p) is a continuous, closed operator, its inverse
operator, i.e., R−1 (r), exists and the proof is completed.
By Theorem 1, the utility of sensor i in the form of (4)
can be rewritten as in (10). It is now possible for each
sensor to optimize the individual utility by deciding on its
transmission rate instead of the received powers from the RF-
energy beacons. Then, we can obtain the following condition
for the existence of the NE in game Gs:
THEOREM 2. The NE to the noncooperative game Gs exists
if am2 − c ≥ 0 and ∑
j∈N
rj ≥ 1.
Proof. By (10), ui (ri, r−i) is continuous and differentiable
on ri, ∀i ∈ N . Now, we examine the second derivatives of
ui (ri, r−i) with respect to ri as shown in (11), ∀i ∈ N :
∂2ui(ri,r−i)
∂ri2
=−φ∂
2P t(R−1i (r),d
t
i)
∂ri2
−2am2 + 2c
∑
j 6=i
rj
/(∑
j∈N
rj
)3
.
(11)
By Theorem 2, the sum of the last two terms in (11), i.e.,
−2am2+2c
∑
j 6=i
rj
/(∑
j∈N
rj
)3
, is smaller than 0. Moreover,
since ri = Ri (pi,p−i) defined in (1) is concave with respect
to pi, its inverse operator, i.e., pi = R−1i (r), is correspond-
ingly convex with respect to ri according to the injective prop-
erty. Since P t
(
R−1i (r) , d
t
i
)
is a linear function of R−1i (r),
−φ∂
2P t(R−1i (r),d
t
i)
∂ri2
is smaller than 0, and ∂
2
∂ri2
ui (ri, r−i) is
therefore smaller than 0. According to Theorem 1 in [12], the
solution to the noncooperative game Gs exists, and the proof
is completed.
It is well-known that following the concavity condition
in Theorem 2, the continuous better-reply in the form of
simultaneous gradient ascent admits an equilibrium point (see
Theorem 7 in [12]). Due to the space limit, we omit the
presentation of the equilibrium searching algorithm and the
discussion on the globally asymptotic stability of the equilib-
rium. Interested readers are referred to [12] for more details.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present numerical studies to evaluate
the performance of the IoT crowdsensing system. For
ease of illustration, we consider 10 sensors, i.e, |N | = 10,
working as a sensing cloud. The bandwidth of a sensor
is bi = 2, ∀i ∈ N , and the noise σ is 1. The vector of
the distances between the sensors and the access point
connected to the blockchain, i.e., d = [di]i∈N , is set
to be [0.25, 0.2, 0.15, 0.25, 0.2, 0.15, 0.25, 0.2, 0.15, 0.25],
and α = [αi]i∈N = [3.5, 3, 2.5, 3.5, 3, 2.5, 3.5, 3, 2.5, 3.5].
The channel gain g = [gi]i∈N is set to be
[1.95, 2, 2.18, 1.95, 2, 2.18, 1.95, 2, 2.18, 1.95]. The price
of unit received power φ is set to be 0.01, and the circuit
and sensing power vector for the sensors c = [ci]i∈N , is
[1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 1]. The coefficients in the blockchain
power consumption model are a = 0.1, b = 0.1, c = 0.1 and
the computational power coefficient is m = 3. The distance
between the sensors and RF-energy beacons dt = [dti]i∈N is
[1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 1] × 10−3 + 1 and η = 2. The price of
unit bitrate of sensors is λi = 20, ∀i ∈ N .
A. Numerical Result
Figures 2(a) and (b) show the NE and best responses,
respectively. Figure 2(a) illustrates the NE of the transmission
rates for sensors 2 and 3. The NE is the point at which the best
responses for sensors 2 and 3 intersect. We observe that the
transmission rate of sensor 3 increase as the computational
power coefficient m increases. The reason is that when m
increases, the computational power increases more quickly,
resulting in high energy consumption of the blockchain. Con-
sequently, the transaction fee rises sharply, and hence the less
cost-effective transaction fees that sensor 3 will be charged. In
this case, sensor 3 increase its transmission rate. In contrast,
the transmission rate of sensor 2 decreases as the value of
the computational power coefficient m increases. The reason
is that the transmission rate of sensor 2 is higher than that
of sensor 3, which means that the transaction fee of sensor
2 increases more rapidly than that of sensor 3. Accordingly,
sensor 2 decreases its transmission rate.
We then evaluate the utilities of sensors 2 and 3. In
Fig. 2(b), the utility of sensor 2 changes because of the
different transmission rates for transferring the data to the
blockchain. From Fig. 2(b), there is a point where the utility
of sensor 2 is maximized, which is pointed by the arrowhead
of “Best response”. This point indicates the NE for sensor 2.
ui (ri, r−i) = λiri − φP t
(
R−1i (r) , d
t
i
)− ri∑
j∈N
rj
a
m∑
j∈N
rj
2 + b
m∑
j∈N
rj
+ c
 . (10)
Transmission rate of sensor 3
0.27 0.28 0.29 0.3 0.31
Tr
an
sm
is
si
on
 ra
te
 o
f s
en
so
r 2
0.28
0.29
0.3
0.31
0.32
(a)
Sensor 2 with m=3
Sensor 3 with m=3
Sensor 2 with m=4
Sensor 3 with m=4
Nash equilibrium
(m=3)
Nash equilibrium
(m=4)
Transmission rate
0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4
Ut
ilit
y
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
(b)
Sensor 2 with m=3
Sensor 3 with m=3
Sensor 2 with m=4
Sensor 3 with m=4
Best response
of sensor 3 (m=3)
Best response
of sensor 2 (m=4)
Best response
of sensor 2 (m=3)
Best response
of sensor 3 (m=4)
Figure 2: (a) Nash equilibrium and (b) best response.
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Figure 3: (a) Transmission rates, (b) ratio of transaction fee,
and (c) utilities for each sensor.
As is evident from Fig. 2(b), this utility, which is a function
of the transmission rate, is unimodal, and the optimal solution
can be obtained analytically.
We next investigate the sensors’ states, i.e., the transmis-
sion rates, ratio of the total transaction fee, and utilities in
Figs. 3(a), (b), and (c), respectively. As shown in Fig. 3, the
transmission rates of sensors 1, 4, 7, and 10 are among the
highest ones because of their shortest distance to the RF-
energy beacons. Specifically for sensors 1 and 2, the gap
between sensors 1 and 2 in the utility is even larger than that in
the transmission rate, i.e., u1u2 ≈ 0.350.33 > r1r2 ≈ 0.310.3 . The reason
is that each sensor needs to pay the transaction fee according
to its fraction of the sum of all the sensors’ transmission rates
while the total transaction fee is increasing rapidly, i.e., as a
convex function, with respect to the total transmission rates.
This means that the less the sensor’s fraction of the sum of
all the sensors’ transmission rates is, the less cost-effective
transaction fee that it will be charged. This is consistent with
the result shown in Fig. 2.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a noncooperative-game
model to analyze the transmission strategy in the self-
organized wireless-powered IoT crowdsensing system built
upon permissionless blockchains. We have focused on the in-
teractions of the sensors and considered the impact of both the
interference and the blockchain maintenance cost on the sen-
sors’ utilities. Analytically, we have established a joint model
describing the impact of the sensors’ transmission strategies
on their transmission rate and the needed transaction fee on the
blockchain side. We have studied the equilibrium strategies of
the sensors in the wireless-powered IoT crowdsensing system
by using best response. We have analytically examined the
conditions for the solution, i.e., the Nash equilibrium, of the
game to exist. Our future work will extend to the study in the
impact of user-demands on the sensors’ strategies.
REFERENCES
[1] C. V. Networking, “Cisco global cloud index: Forecast and methodology,
2016-2021. white paper,” Cisco Public, San Jose, Feb. 2018.
[2] O. Galinina, K. Mikhaylov, K. Huang, S. Andreev and Y. Koucheryavy,
“Wirelessly powered urban crowd sensing over wearables: Trading
energy for data,” IEEE Wireless Communications, vol. 25, no. 2, pp.
140–149, Apr. 2018.
[3] R. K. Ganti, F. Ye and H. Lei, “Mobile crowdsensing: current state and
future challenges,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 49, no. 11,
pp. 32–39, Nov. 2011.
[4] M. Marjanovi, A. Antoni and I. P. arko, “Edge computing architecture
for mobile crowdsensing,” IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 10662–10674, Jan.
2018.
[5] W. Wang, D. T. Hoang, Z. Xiong, D. Niyato, P. Wang, P. Hu and
Y. Wen, “A survey on consensus mechanisms and mining management
in blockchain networks,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.02707, 2018.
[6] S. Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system,” Self-
published Paper, May 2008.
[7] M. Castro and B. Liskov, “Practical byzantine fault tolerance and
proactive recovery,” ACM Trans. Comput. Syst., vol. 20, no. 4, pp.
398–461, Nov. 2002.
[8] C. D. Clack, V. A. Bakshi and L. Braine, “Smart contract templates:
foundations, design landscape and research directions,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1608.00771, 2016.
[9] L. Luu, V. Narayanan, C. Zheng, K. Baweja, S. Gilbert and P. Saxena,
“A secure sharding protocol for open blockchains,” in Proceedings of
the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security. ACM, 2016, pp. 17–30.
[10] R. Teodorescu and J. Torrellas, “Variation-aware application scheduling
and power management for chip multiprocessors,” in ACM SIGARCH
computer architecture news. IEEE Computer Society, 2008, vol. 36, pp.
363–374.
[11] F. Baccelli, B. Błaszczyszyn et al., “Stochastic geometry and wireless
networks: Volume ii applications,” Foundations and Trends R© in
Networking, vol. 4, no. 1–2, pp. 1–312, 2010.
[12] J. B. Rosen, “Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points for
concave n-person games,” Econometrica, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 520–534,
1965.
